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USA: A CIVILIZATION OF ITS OWN?
PETER O’BRIEN
POBRIEN@TRINITY.EDU
INTRODUCTION
“The object [America] is wholly new in the world. It is singu-
lar…Nothing in history is parallel to it.”1
-----Edmund Burke
Distinct civilizations can have common origins.2 Byzantine,
Western and Islamic civilization each grew its separate way from Judaic
and Hellenic roots. In similar fashion, the United States of America may
well be in the process of branching off to form a civilization increasing-
ly distinguishable from European civilization. The separation has been
gradually but steadily underway since 1776. However, in civilizational
time, 240 years represent a rather short period. The division has not yet
fully matured. So the precise lines of demarcation are less than crystal
clear, but the general contours are visible. It is time to entertain the idea
of two civilizations – (North) American3 and European – where we have
traditionally spoken of a single Western civilization.
Of course, the cousin civilizations will continue to share much in
common, as do Byzantine and Islamic civilization, for instance. But they
may differ enough to merit distinction. As erstwhile ISCSC member
Max Lerner argued in America as a Civilization in 1957, “recognizing
the ties of America with Europe, one can [nevertheless] argue for
America as a civilization.”4
Like Lerner then, I do not now seek to offer yet another rendition of
“American Exceptionalism.” The theory was celebrated in the 1950s,
then castigated in the 1970s, and recently perhaps resuscitated. Sources
and symptoms of America’s alleged uniqueness range from the absence
of an aristocracy (and a working class), to the open frontier, to the
Constitution, to inventive genius, to immigration, to denominationalism,
to anti-intellectualism, to sports, and even to the assertion itself of being
exceptional.5
We have matured enough to understand that any society, when
viewed up close enough, can appear exceptional and, when viewed at
great distance, can seem similar to others. Below I do contend that
America is different from Europe (in some key but hardly all respects)
but not that it is necessarily exceptional, that is, following a specific
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course of development open to no other peoples. On the contrary, the
phenomenon of worldwide Americanization will figure prominently in
my argument.
I employ a methodology that follows the lead of European intellec-
tuals. If the self-appointed gatekeepers of Western civilization have per-
sistently viewedAmerica as being alien and even threatening to Europe,
as I argue they have, then perhaps the birth child has in fact grown into
something genuinely distinct from the parent.
Samuel Huntington defines civilization as “the biggest ‘we’ within
which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other
‘thems’ out there.”6 To Europe’s cultivated class America has seemed
more like a “them” than a “we.”
Three distinguishing characteristics stand out in the depictions and
analyses of America produced by European intellectuals from 1776 to
the present. I choose to label these 1) the exaltation of the ordinary, 2)
the relaxation of self-criticism, and 3) the liberation from history.
Europeans, of course, employed a plethora of expressions to character-
ize America, but most fall into one of these three depictions.
The three characteristics helped to give birth to -- but then were
themselves deeply fortified by -- three social developments inAmerican
history which particularly grabbed the attention of European observers.
I call these 1) democratization, 2) consumerism, and 3) postmodernism.
Each has persisted and intensified since its birth around the turn of
the nineteenth, the twentieth, and the twenty-first century respectively.
The cultural characteristics and social developments combined in a way
that madeAmerica appear increasingly stranger to European savants. To
the extent that aspects of these cultural characteristics and social devel-
opments surfaced in Europe, they were widely viewed as
“Americanization,” that is, as undesirable importations from an alien
civilization.
Some important caveats are in order regarding the methodology of
viewing America through European lenses. I treat the differences
between America and Europe that Europeans have stressed and largely
ignore other differences (and similarities) that may or may not be criti-
cal to making an ultimately compelling case for a separate American
civilization. Similarly, the alleged causes of American difference dis-
cussed below are those Europeans have underscored.
My argument, then, is knowingly incomplete and suggestive rather
than exhaustive and conclusive. I aim to provoke debate among readers
by pointing out that the lion’s share of European intellectuals refused
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and refuse to admit America as a bona fide member of their cherished
civilization.
Whether their perspective is accurate or needs to be augmented is
for readers to decide. My central task is to present their perspective.
Limited space makes it impossible to treat all European thinkers who
mused about America. I stress views from a variety of countries to show
that similar opinions were held across Europe. Needless to say, total
conformity scarcely obtained. But, again in the interest of limited scope,
I overlook the minority of mavericks who bucked the trend regarding
impressions of America. I also ignore the European masses who, judg-
ing by large-scale immigration to America, did not see eye to eye with
their preceptors.
KEY TRAITS OF NORTH AMERICAN CIVILIZATION
European elites have long described America as a place where the
ordinary rule over the extraordinary rather than vice versa. In
L’Aristocratie en Amérique of 1883 Frédéric Gaillardet, for instance,
argued that America had effectively ennobled the masses: “The United
States’ political and social constitution has poeticized power and glori-
fied the rabble.” He may have been thinking of Karl Marx’s earlier
remark that, “given its political and social organization, ordinary people
of good will can accomplish feats which only heroes could accomplish
in the old world.”7 Talk of the endless possibilities for average folks had
been a staple of European travel reports since colonial times. Michel
Guillaume Jean Crèvecoeur (better known by the pseudonym J. Hector
Saint John), for instance, wrote of the colonies: “There is room for
every body in America: has he any particular talent, or industry? He
exerts it in order to procure a livelihood, and it succeeds. Is he a mer-
chant? The avenues of trade are infinite; is he eminent in any respect?
He will be employed and respected. Does he love a country life?
Pleasant farms present themselves; he may purchase what he wants….”8
Other Europeans echoed the Frenchman. “Happy is the country,”
wrote Harriet Martineau in the 1830s, “where the factory-girls carry
parasols, and pig-drivers wear spectacles.” American laborers, accord-
ing to Francis Grund, enjoyed “comforts which would hardly enter the
imagination of similar orders in Europe.”9
From the European perspective, America was a society in which
the herd stampeded freely and ferociously over anyone who sought to
shepherd it. In contrast to Europe, where gods, emperors, kings, lords,
even ideas reigned, in America the ordinary man ruled. Society existed
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to serve his interest rather than the other way around. As Harold Laski
summarized the difference in 1948, “the ordinary man has the convic-
tion that no gates may be barred to his entry…there is no assumption
that he is moving outside the boundaries to which by his origins, he
ought to be confined.
For the ordinary American citizen no trace has remained of that
feudal heritage which still has deep influence on the social relationships
of most European countries.” He added that “this difference in expecta-
tion is…vital to the understanding of the difference between the
American tradition and that of Europe.”10
America is also the land in which history seems not to matter.
“Nothing perishes which history sanctified,” professed Novalis.11 But
for Henry Ford, “history is bunk.”12 Many Europeans italicize the ahis-
toricist assumptions buttressing America’s foundation. Crèvecoeur
wrote that “He is an American, who leav (es) behind him all his ancient
prejudices and manners.”13 To the American, remarked Alexis de
Tocqueville, “nothing either is or ought to be fixed forever.”14 More than
a century later, while repeating his compatriot’s famous tour of
America, Jean Baudrillard found the same to be true. Americans, he
averred, inhabit a “perpetual present.” They experience their past as nei-
ther bane nor benefit. In fact, they do not experience it at all. It is sim-
ply irrelevant.15 Laski had noted a generation earlier that the American
“is rarely interested in his past because he is so certain that his future
will bear no relation to it.”16
America further stands out in the European imagination as a land
neither burdened nor enriched by serious reflection. Call it “pragma-
tism,” “getting on,” “live and let live,” or “aimlessness,” “spiritual
death,” “collective idiocy,” Americans tend not to engage in serious
reflection of any kind, especially self-reflection. They do not brood like
Europeans. Baudrillard, echoing an argument put forth by Hannah
Arendt in On Revolution,17 traces the anti-intellectualism to the
American Revolution. The revolutionaries, he explains, wasted little
time philosophizing and instead jumped headlong into the act of creat-
ing a tangible new commonwealth. By contrast, philosophers got the
upper hand in the French Revolution and established an ideology to
govern actors. Europeans have ever since evaluated their actual polities
against this ideal and come up, of course, lacking. Without such a stan-
dard Americans have taken thoughtless but soothing pride in their
accomplishment.18
Mindlessness has long caught the attention of Europeans interested
in America. As early as 1770 Guillaume-Thomas abbé de Raynal was
disgusted by the fact “that America has not yet produced a good poet, a
skillful mathematician, a man of genius in any art or science.”19 “In no
country in the civilized world,” Tocqueville observed, “is less attention
paid to philosophy than in the United States.”20 The “Yankees have no
ideas,” asserted Ferdinand Lassalle.21 “Prolonged reflection,” Friedrich
Nietzsche complained, “almost gives people a bad conscience.”22
Indeed, observed Laski, they “equate contemplation with laziness.”23
“These Americans are dead, stone-dead as far as intellectual life is con-
cerned,” wrote Nikolaus Lenau to his brother.24 According to Bismarck,
“God has a special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States
of America.”25 George Bernard Shaw declared “the hundred percent
American to be ninety-nine percent idiot.”26
Along the way somewhere Americans seemed to lose the ability to
discriminate. Isaiah Berlin once called them “the sort of people, who
want yes or no for an answer. No nuances.”27 “Never did American cul-
ture,” in the eyes of eminent Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, “chal-
lenge the individual to pause and reflect, to find coherence and mean-
ing, to consummate rather than merely to consume.”28 “In America,”
found Simone de Beauvoir, “no one needs to read because no one
thinks.”29 “I can’t live with people incapable of subtle ideas, however
virtuous they are,” complains the protagonist of Henri Beyle Stendhal’s
Lucien Leuwen. “I’d a hundred times rather the elegant ways of a cor-
rupt court.”30
This nation of ninnies famously mistook quantity for quality, exu-
berance for excellence. “The primacy of sheer quantity,” claimed
Martin Heidegger, “this is the principle we call Americanism”31 Graham
Greene spoke of “the eternal adolescence of the American mind.”32 The
nuances of supreme sophistication as well as the delights of refined cul-
tivation simply blow past most Americans without notice. Theirs seems
to the European pedant a language confined to cant.
DEMOCRACY
Democracy flourished in America more than in Europe and helped
further to advance the three attributes distinguishing the budding
American civilization. Following 1776, European visitors flooded into
the United States as if into a zoo to see an exotic creature: democracy.33
Most of them sent missives homeward and even published their obser-
vations — so many, that early in the nineteenth century publications
about America comprised “a major share of the European publishing
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industry.”34 “Men whom the reading of philosophic books had secretly
converted to the love of liberty,” noted the marquis de Condorcet,
“became enthusiastic over the liberty of a foreign people while they
waited for the moment when they could recover their own.”35
When that moment arrived in 1789 with the French Revolution
democrats around Europe rejoiced as they had in 1776. But it did not
take long before their hopes were blighted. When the historic struggle
on behalf of Liberté, Égalité, and Fraternité degenerated into despot-
ism, it occasioned lachrymose gloom. In 1815 Benjamin Constant com-
plained that “all the constitutions which have been given to France
guaranteed the liberty of the individual, and yet under the rule of these
constitutions, it has been constantly violated.”36
Tocqueville later concurred: “of all ideas and sentiments which pre-
pared the Revolution, the notion and the taste of public liberty strictly
speaking have been the first ones to disappear.” Whereas “in America
men have the opinions and passions of democracy;” he added, “in
Europe we have still the passions and opinions of revolution.”37
Friedrich Schiller spoke of “a generation unprepared to receive” liber-
ty.38 Friedrich von Gentz lamented: “The door of hope seemed to me
closed forever, to Germany and to Europe.” For “the men of the
Revolution intended to unite all of the nations of the earth in one great
cosmopolitan confederation, but they succeeded only in unleashing the
cruelest world war that has ever shaken society and torn it apart.”39
Napoleon’s despotic antics so enraged Beethoven that he tore the dedi-
cation to the emperor from the score of the Eroica Symphony.
But it was more than the success in one land and failure in another
of a system of government that caught Europeans’ attention. In America
democracy transformed into a way of life that generated leveling influ-
ences throughout society. Tocqueville opened Democracy in America
with the following lines:
Among the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in
the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general
equality of condition among the people. I readily discovered the
prodigious influence that this primary fact exercises on the whole
course of society; it gives a peculiar direction to public opinion and a
peculiar tenor to the laws; it imparts new maxims to the governing
authorities and peculiar habits to the governed.40
The Frenchman and other Europeans were observing what Robert
Wiebe calls the “revolution in choices,”41 that is, the thorough-going
democratization of political, economic and social life (for white men)
Peter O’Brien 35
which transpired during the maverick republic’s first fifty years.
“Privilege in all its forms came under attack,” writes Joyce Appleby,42
creating, according to Liah Greenfield an environment of “unreserved
and unparalleled egalitarianism.”43
Extensive democratization propelled forward the exaltation of the
ordinary, relaxation of self-criticism, and liberation from history. In
America ordinary man unshackled himself and forced his interests,
however base, to the top of society’s agenda. Duc de La Rochefoucauld
sententiously observed that even backwoods wretches “consider them-
selves on an equal footing with the best educated people of the country,
and upon the principle of equality they intrude themselves into every
company.”44
Tocqueville marveled that an uncouth boor like Davy Crockett
could stand for, let alone win election over, a wealthy, refined oppo-
nent.45 Heinrich Heine deplored an America, “where the most repulsive
of all tyrants, the populace, hold vulgar sway.”46
With leaders like Crockett, deep thought lay imperiled. Superficial
thinking expressed itself most saliently in mammonism. Unalloyed
materialism became a simple-minded way to evaluate the quality of
one’s life. European observers repeatedly complained about money-
mad Americans’ one-track mind. Rochefoucauld, who had sought
refuge in America from Robespierre’s Reign of Terror, deplored in his
safe haven “an immoderate love of money.”47
Compatriot Benjamin Saint-Victor wrote in his Letters from the
United States of America (1835), “the main question here (and it’s the
alpha and omega of life), is to gain money, and then to use this money
to gain even more.”48 In The Charterhouse of Parma (1839) Stendhal
had the Duchess seek to dissuade Fabrizio from immigrating toAmerica
by depicting for him “the cult of the god dollar, and the respect that
must be paid to merchants and artisans in the street, who by their vote
determine everything.”49
Heine too grumbled that “worldly pursuits are their true religion,
and money is their God, their only Almighty God.”50 Dickens recalled
from his visit that “all their cares, hopes, joys, affections, and associa-
tions seemed to be melted down into dollars.”51 English Captain
Frederick Marryat went so far as preposterously to assert that “dollar
worship” affected Americans’ physiology and caused them all to look
alike: “this produced a certain contraction of the brow, knitting of the
eyebrows, and compression of the lips.”52
Fanny Trollope held that no conversation took place in America
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without mention of the word “dollar.” “Such unity of purpose…can, I
believe, be found nowhere else except, perhaps, in an ants’ nest.”53 It
was Trollope’s Domestic Manners of the Americans (1832), which
immortalized the picture ofAmerica as a vast bog of vulgarity where the
tasteless habits of the lowly asphyxiated the good manners of the
respectable. The Germans would read a similar tale in Ferdinand
Kürnberger’s bestselling novel, Amerikamüde (1855).
Besides poverty, nothing insured that the lower classes in Europe
would be trapped in the same destiny as their ancestors more than the
legal hierarchies of the ancien régime. America never had a formal aris-
tocracy, but after 1776 virtually all legal statuses distinguishing rank
disappeared (for white males). Legal equality coupled with boundless
economic and social opportunity enabled Americans (with time and
industry) to escape their bleak pasts. This liberation from history lured
millions of immigrants (from Europe and elsewhere) to America where
they set out to make themselves anew. As one Old World scholar put it,
“the immigrant arrives with centuries of inherited experience, but
America makes him young, almost childish.”54 James Bryce agreed:
“the intellectual and moral atmosphere into which the settlers from
Europe come has more power to assimilate them than their race quali-
ties have power to change it.”55
CONSUMERISM
Interest in American democracy hardly disappeared in the second
half of the nineteenth century, or in the twentieth century for that mat-
ter. Bryce, for instance, published his favorable and much read analysis
of The American Commonwealth in 1888. By this time, however,
Europeans began detecting another critical difference between America
and Europe beyond democratization. At home persons consumed to
live. But across the Atlantic they lived to consume. Though the precise
term “consumerism” would not be coined for years to come, this is what
the Europeans were glimpsing — and increasingly dreading.
Consumerism arose toward the end of the nineteenth century and
came to dominate American life by the 1920s. Its influence stretched far
outside economics into politics, religion, science, culture and beyond56
As with the “revolution in choices” at the end of the eighteenth and
beginning of the nineteenth century, the consumerist “revolution” a cen-
tury later further set American apart from European civilization. In
America and Europe consumerism originated with the urban middle
classes57 But in America it spread quickly (though hardly immediately58)
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down what remained of the social hierarchy and out into the country-
side, becoming a shared national way of life. In Europe, by contrast,
entrenched forces, often the same ones that impeded democracy, slowed
consumerism.59 As a result, America became a middle-class society, but
Europe merely a society with a middle class.
No one was more aware of America’s leadership in consumerism
than the Europeans. As always, the Americans had more money to
spend than Europeans. Thus Urbain Gohier bemoaned America’s “fat,
well-dressed, well-scrubbed, well-rested workers” who earn the “salary
of professors at the Collège de France.”60 But the Americans excelled in
selling as well. British advertisers were so impressed that they aped
their American counterparts.61
A Swiss visitor to America noted that giant department stores were
to be found not only in the biggest metropolises, as in Europe, but in
many smaller cities as well. AGerman window dresser visiting the USA
in the 1920s conceded that his American counterparts greatly outshone
himself and his European colleagues. While the latter still “barricaded”
their storefronts with “bargain goods,” the Americans had learned how
“to allure the imagination,” “stir up insatiable appetites,” and “trans-
form goods into roses.” A regular French visitor sensed such a change
between 1901 and 1925 that he concluded, “the very basis of the
American civilization is no longer the same.”62
It was roughly during these same years that European high brows
coined the term “Americanization” to stand for the increasing number
of concessions to American consumerism they witnessed at home. The
exact origins of the notion “Americanization” elude us, but by the turn
of the twentieth century it was uttered everywhere (in Europe at least).
Baudelaire was surely among the first coiners of the term when he
referred to his century as “Americanised by its zoocratic industrial
philosophers.”63 “From the 1870s on,” Fritz Stern relates, “conservative
writers in imperial Germany expressed fear that the German soul would
be destroyed by ‘Americanization,’ that is by mammonism, material-
ism, mechanization and mass society.”64
Nietzsche, for instance, in the Gay Science, maintained that
America “is already beginning ferociously to infect old Europe and is
spreading a spiritual emptiness over the continent.”65 Rudyard Kipling,
who married an American, predicted that America “will sway the world
with one foot as a man tilts a seesaw plank.”66 So entrenched was the
notion of Americanization that fin de siècle psychiatric literature creat-
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ed a “nosological” category called “Americanization,” an illness of
modern life.67 W.T. Stead published The Americanization of the World in
1901. Georges Duhamel later echoed the same theme in America: The
Menace (1931). The concept of “Americanization,” and particularly the
derogatory tone with which it was invariably discussed, reveal that, at
least as far as European literati were concerned, imports from America
were deemed alien and threatening to European civilization.
Relentless consumerism further fortified the three characteristics
that distinguished American from European civilization. The exalted
status of the common man in America often invokes images of pander-
ing to the masses and settling for the lowest common denominator. Or
as John Kenneth Gailbraith put it, “the bland lead the bland.”68 Such
metaphors actually miss the mark, at least as far as consumerism is con-
cerned. For the power of consumerism reposed in transforming the
common and ordinary into something seemingly grand, even virtuous.
Put differently, American consumerism achieved for its adherents
the highest common denominator. In 1884 Sir Lepel Griffin described
an American culture in which “mediocrity is allowed to take the high-
est place.”69 The market seemed able to provide plain folks with the
privileges only the most powerful had enjoyed once upon a time. The
grandest department stores deliberately designed their interiors to give
customers a sense that they were strolling through lavish halls. Often
giving themselves regal names like “Palace,” “Majestic,” “Empire,”
cinemas went for the same effect.70 Modern appliances were invariably
marketed to consumers as an escape from the plebian drudgeries of
life.71 Businesses instructed employees to treat customers like kings and
queens, an American proclivity that aroused particular indignation in
Europe.72 In this way consumerism blurred distinctions between the cul-
tivated and the crass by lifting the latter rather than demeaning the for-
mer.
Consumerism further invigorated the deeply rooted anti-intellectu-
alism in America. In 1930 the Europeans awarded Sinclair Lewis the
Nobel Prize for Literature in large part to applaud his scathing depiction
of the effects of consumerism in Babbit (1922). For the protagonist,
“these standard advertised wares – toothpastes, socks, tires, cameras,
instantaneous hot-water heaters – were his symbols and proofs of excel-
lence; at first the signs, then the substitutes, for joy and passion and wis-
dom.”73 But this was hardly the first time European elites had drawn dis-
paraging attention to American superficiality. Well before consumerism
came of age, A. D’Alembert in the 1850s had devoted an entire chapter
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of his encyclopedia to “Les Beaux-Arts en Amerique.” He sardonically
left the pages blank.74
Fellow Frenchman, Georges Clemenceau, decades later described
American history as a “progression from barbarism to decadence with-
out a detour through culture.” Wilhelm von Pelenz contended that the
“Americanization of culture means trivialization, mechanization, stupi-
fication.”75 Mathew Arnold insisted that “America…is without general
intelligence” — a “fool’s paradise.”76 No one’s tongue was sharper than
that of George Bernard Shaw, who sneered at the so-called “Hundred
percent American.”
He was a bombinating sort of man, if I may coin the expression. He
was monumental; but he was so void of anything new or different that
we in Europe staggered when we contemplated his immensity and its
utter insignificance. We said, what is the secret of this tremendous
man, who talks so splendidly and has nothing to say? This man whose
mind, although it is evidently an intensely live mind, might just as
well be an intense absence of mind, because he doesn’t seem to know
anything of any particular consequence. He is always in a state of
vociferous excitement about entirely trivial things. He quotes the
poets thunderously to give point to piffle.77
No dream did consumerism help better to fulfill than the wish to
escape the past. Advertising gave instructions to millions of immigrants
on how to blur their backgrounds and take on a genuine American
appearance often in no more than one generation’s time. The urge to
“close a deal” moved many (not all) to suppress prejudices of race, eth-
nicity and creed inherited from the past78 Consumerism further dealt
history a blow in the celebration of the cult of the new. Consumers were
told they had to have the latest models and newest products. Older
goods (and sadly even people) were downgraded as undesirable and dis-
pensable. German poet Rainer Maria Rilke, in 1925, scorned the things
without history pouring into his beloved Vaterland from America:
Now there come crowding over from America empty, indifferent
things, pseudo-things, DUMMY-LIFE…A house, in the American
understanding, an American apple or vine, has NOTHING in com-
mon with the house, the fruit, the grape into which the hope and med-
itation of our forefathers had entered…The animated, experienced
things that SHARE OUR LIVES are coming to an end and cannot be
replaced.”79
Rilke was in effect mourning the erosion of historicism, the idea
expressed by the likes of Hegel, Darwin and Marx that the past inex-
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orably determines the future. Historicist thinking dominated European
culture throughout the nineteenth century. Thus, Gustave Flaubert
declared, “we are above all in a historically minded century.”80 How dif-
ferent and alien could America be?
POSTMODERNISM
After WWI and especially WWII, Europeans devoted countless
pages to inspection of the new Western hegemon. The latter’s democra-
cy and consumerism figured prominently. But Europe’s cutting-edge
thinkers eventually discerned and articulated something new on the
American horizon: postmodernism.
Postmodernism has myriad meanings. Central to any definition,
though, is a sense of unlimited contestedness. Nothing is sacrosanct.
Deities, truths, canons, definitions, laws, customs, styles, institutions
which were once taken for granted and that gave direction, meaning and
purpose to life come under attack and lose much of their authority and
vitality. In this utterly shifting, indefinite environment the power of per-
ception, persuasion and performance reign supreme. If one can per-
suade (but also coax, trick, cajole, manipulate) persons to believe that
something, however outlandish, is true and real, then for them, at least,
it is true and real until, of course, a superior persuader enters the stage.
That prince of postmodernism, Andy Warhol, captured the essence of
the concept when he said of his field: “Art is what you can get away
with.” The American postmodernist Stanley Fish characterizes his posi-
tion as “anything goes which can be made to go.” 81
Postmodernism has its philosophical origins in Europe in a line of
thinkers stretching from Nietzsche through Heidegger and Wittgenstein
up to Derrida and Foucault. However, particularly European analysts
maintain that postmodernism constitutes in America a budding style of
life rather than, as in Europe, merely a theory about contemporary
lifestyles. A chief reason for this is something I term “the virtual revo-
lution,” which follows in the wake of the democratic and consumerist
“revolutions.” The former has been transpiring in America since WWII.
At its heart lies the astonishing achievement of turning fiction into fact.
What is meant by the term “virtual revolution?” “America is a
gigantic hologram,” wrote Jean Baudrillard in 198682 A few years earli-
er Umberto Eco titled his tour of America Travels in Hyperreality83
These and other authors perceive a phantasmagoric America gradually
but relentlessly substituting fiction for fact. The image, simulacrum,
icon — in a word virtual reality — has become so tantalizing, ubiqui-
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tous and credible as to become a serious, indeed necessary, alternative
to actual reality. In this America “the absolute fake” becomes a “substi-
tute for reality, as something even more real.”84 “Illusions…present
themselves as truth” and obtain an “autonomy of the virtual, henceforth
liberated from the real.”85 “Today there is only a single truth, the simu-
lacrum, the truth which tells us that there is no truth beyond the image
itself.”86 We are dealing with nothing less than “the murder of reality.”87
The precise origins of the “disappearance of the real” elude us.
Agreement exists, though, that they lie in the nation’s legendary enter-
tainment industry and its kindred profession of advertising. Already in
1925 F. Scott Fitzgerald has Daisy Buchanan say to Jay Gatsby, “You
resemble the advertisement of the man.”88 Hollywood produced films
about its own power to mold society as early as 1937 (A Star Is Born)
and 1941 (Citizen Kane). Warhol and the Pop Art movement of the
1950s and 1960s underscored the power and ubiquity of the icon.
But the 1980s stand out as the period when this virtual revolution
truly came of age. Needless to say, it helped to inaugurate the decade by
putting a movie star in the White House. Not only did the “Gipper”
often confound real and celluloid life, he and his handlers proved espe-
cially adroit at image management. They spun Reagan’s message so
adroitly, that he became known as the “Teflon president,” to whom no
criticism stuck. His successors, not to mention virtually every other suc-
cessful politician, honed image manipulation to such a point that one
advisor to George W. Bush gloated that “when we act, we create our
own reality.”89 Indeed, in 2003 the White House managed to convince a
majority of credulous Americans that Saddam Hussein possessed
weapons of mass destruction and links to Al Qaeda.90
The substitution of fiction for fact has seeped into many walks of
life beyond politics. In The Truman Show (1998) and The Matrix (1999)
Hollywood toyed with the idea of an entirely feigned society around
whose virtual edges its real (maybe virtual?) members could not see.
Americans now regularly tour virtual houses, try on virtual clothes
(even faces), root for virtual sports teams, worship at virtual shrines,
lust after virtual porn stars, even lead virtual (or second) lives.
In America, claim European commentaries, the phony has simply
gotten better at being real than reality. “What television and film have
brought us is images realer than reality.”91 “Illusion is not the opposite
of reality,” asserts Baudrillard, “it is a more subtle reality.” Reality
winds up appearing like a cheap imitation of itself when pitted against
the fabricated image. Additionally, the latter amasses converts by being
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a “consoling illusion of truth.” In other words, the bowdlerized reality
almost always appears more interesting and soothing to cuddle than
actual reality. Furthermore, in this “coup de théâtre” the image-makers
have perfected the art of disguising their own techniques. “The cine-
matographic illusion faded as the technical prowess increased.” “We
live in a world where the highest function of the sign is to make reality
disappear and, at the same time, to mask that disappearance.”92
The virtual revolution has strengthened America’s three distin-
guishing traits. If America had long offered ordinary man a comfortable
home, this new hallucinatory America represents a funhouse at a carni-
val. Reality — the monotonous humdrum of everyday life — has
always been the bane of ordinary man’s existence. While extraordinary
man danced through a life filled with exhilarating, spectacular turns,
ordinary man had to slosh through the endless bog of tedium and drudg-
ery. Not so, once “the US is utopia achieved.” For in an America where
the “screen take[s] precedence over reality,” common folk can at will
turn off drab reality and click on anodyne, mesmerizing virtual reality.
Moreover, in this “true fiction” the conventional rules of reality —
always stacked against ordinary man — no longer apply.93
Paradoxes somehow make sense. Poverty turns into plenty, indo-
lence into industry, banality into profundity. “All…dreams come true.”94
Reality’s age-old demons — always nastier to ordinary man — are
exorcised. Age is overcome through cosmetic surgery, disease through
wonder drugs, death through cloning. Even enemies fade, at least as we
once experienced them, namely, as genuine adversaries. In “America as
fiction”95 one deals not with a foe’s actual attributes, rather, one picks
and paints an adversary of one’s choosing (“Evil Empire,” “Butcher of
Baghdad,” “Axis of Evil,” “Islamofascism”).96
The virtual revolution has added a new twist to America’s inveter-
ate disregard for history. On the one hand, it further erodes the presence
and power of the past. Like no other, the virtual world lives off rootless,
fleeting images that disappear without a trace as soon as they surface. It
happily digests trends and fads that apotheosize the new and anathema-
tize the old. Baudrillard likens all of American life to a giant screen
replete with ceaselessly changing images but behind which there lies
nothing — no depth, no substance, no time.97 “A nation without essence
or fixed being,” claims fellow Frenchman Bernard-Henri Lévy.98
This perfected, ubiquitous superficiality further liberates America
from history in a way that an old Europe shackled by the past never can
copy. “America ducks the question of origins; it cultivates no origin or
Peter O’Brien 43
mythical authenticity; it has no past and no founding truth. Having
known no primitive accumulation of time, it lives in a perpetual pres-
ent. Having seen no slow, centuries-long accumulation of truth, it lives
in perpetual simulation, in a perpetual present of signs.”99
The virtual revolution also spelled doom for an already torpid crit-
ical culture. “American civilization” is thus “monstrously non-aesthet-
ic.”100 The cinematic society so speeds up life that even those given to
refinement and reflection have little time to stop and think. If the intel-
lectually curious take the time, whatever riddle they ponder is, once
they solve it, so irrelevant, outdated, or obscured that serious reflection
is pointless. Traditional savants are more inconsequential now in
America than any time in their pathetic history.101
In a climate of lame bona fide intellectual caretakers, Baudrillard
points out, banality goes unchallenged and infects all like a “mental
form of AIDS.” “The power of unculture” takes hold and creates a vast
“anti-utopia of unreason” in which ignorance is a virtue and intelligence
a vice. Lacking any “need for metaphysics,” credulous Americans
ignore altogether Europe’s “unhappy intellectualism” and “moribund
critical culture” and delight in the mindless conviction of their own
superiority.102
CONCLUSION
Needless to say, this essay puts much stock in the views of
European intellectuals. It turns on the premise that if so many of them
have deemedAmerica alien — a “them” rather than “we” — then com-
parative civilizationalists ought at least to explore the idea of separate
civilizations — European and American. No one but a fool, of course,
would deny that the two represent kindred civilizations with much in
common. But is this also not true of Byzantine and European civiliza-
tion? European savants, precisely because they do act as the protectors
and preceptors of their civilization, can help alert us to the subtle but
significant differences that distinguish America from Europe.
It was, for instance, Tocqueville (among others), who showed that
democracy represents a form of government in Europe, but an entire
way of life in America. Likewise, it was from the plethora of European
critics — Rochefoucauld, Trollope, Dickens, and the like — who
decried but also discerned American mammonism that we learned that
while Europeans may consume to live, Americans live to consume – a
critical distinction indeed. Buadrillard and Eco taught that postmod-
ernism, while a theory about reality in Europe, constitutes an escape
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from reality in America – the replacement of fact with fiction. Needless
to say, these Europeans often indulge in the kind of stereotyping that
fails to capture the totality of the American experience. But taken
together as a pattern that runs across European periods and countries the
observations help to illuminate America’s prodigious non-European
features.
To take these European observers seriously is, I believe, to treat the
differences as ones of kind rather than degree. Democratization, con-
sumerism, and postmodernism each can be found in Europe and
America, but they were experienced in profoundly different ways in
each setting. In America, we realize in large part thanks to the analyses
of Europeans, the three developments forged but were also themselves
transformed by three defining qualities of the American experience –
the exaltation of the ordinary, the relaxation of self-criticism, and the
liberation from history – that did not emerge in Europe. Had they, the
European masses would not have needed or wished to immigrate to
America in droves. Nor would European Brahmins feel so urgently
compelled to denounce Americanization unless they thought there was
something genuinely different about Europe worth preserving.
Americanization raises the issue of a global civilization. For
Europe is hardly the only part of the planet experiencing the phenome-
non. Some globalization scholars refer to America as the “Rome”103 of
today; others speak of “McWorld.”104 They all point to the emergence of
a single, global civilization bearing a “`Made in the USA’ label.”105
Some even predict that long after the United States of America loses its
geopolitical hegemony, its global civilization, even if centered in, say,
China, will still be profoundly American in its core values and institu-
tions in the way that Europe is still deeply Roman.106
Globalization would appear to undermine the notion of a separate
American civilization. The idea of global civilization, even if America
is acknowledged as its incubator, suggests diminishing distinctions
between once separate civilizations. Or if we designate America as the
newest leader of what David Wilkinson calls “Central civilization,”107
this serves only to emphasize America’s similarities and continuities
with earlier leaders such as ancient Greece and Rome or modern
Europe.
I am not convinced that the global perspective, however valuable,
negates the premise of this essay. European literati hardly embrace the
so-called global civilization as a larger “we.” On the contrary, they
number among the most vehement critics of globalization precisely
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because they interpret it as Americanization.108 When they insist that
Europe has something important to contribute to an emerging global
culture, say its generous welfare state or far-sighted environmentalism,
the contribution is invariably characterized as distinctly European
(meaning non-American).
This, for instance, is the theme of Jürgen Habermas’ The Divided
West and of Gret Haller’s The Limits of Solidarity.109 So we wind up
back where we started. If European thinkers resist acceptingAmerica as
an extension of European civilization on the opposite shores of the
Atlantic; if they too refuse to count themselves as part of a (highly
Americanized) global civilization, then where exactly does America
belong in Huntington’s sense of “we” and “them?” If the USA does not
fit into the European “we,” then is it not indeed a civilization of its own?
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